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Several decades were needed for anthropologists to realise that objects produced by 
humans in society are a social production. Indeed, any given object, be it a battleship, a 
hammer, or a stone picked up from the ground, always results in its fabrication or use, 
through gestures, skills, and knowledge, which may vary from one culture to another. As 
Mauss stated in his paper on ‘the techniques of the body’ (2006 [1935]: 77-95), this is 
true of every possible action on the material world. Here he demonstrated that even the 
most ‘natural’ actions we perform on matter (like walking, swimming, or giving birth) 
are, always and everywhere, cultural productions. At the same time as it has a physical 
function a technique or an object is a component in a system of thought and action which 
is not particularly ‘technical’ itself. In effect, the material use to which a given technique 
or object is put, or the ideas one has about it, may well be related to social strategies, 
actions or domains that have nothing to do with a transformation of the material world. 
Rather, this object or technique may be simultaneously related to non-technical activities. 
As we shall see, a New Guinea garden fence is by no means only to keep pigs away from 
sweet potatoes. Similarly, people would agree that, today, sport shoes are as much related 
to identity and social interaction, as designed for jogging.  
In other words, techniques are as responsible for producing social ties and types of 
information, as they are for transforming the material world. As sociologists of science 
and modern technology put it when they refer to a ‘seamless sociotechnical network’ 
(Hughes 1986), techniques and objects are embedded in other realms of social actions 
which we arbitrarily define and name for the sake of social sciences. And because 
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techniques occur in all social actions, it may be incorrect to isolate a domain in human 
life and production as merely ‘technical’. However, while not belittling or forgetting the 
bulk of human material productions, we can at least loosely decide where techniques 
start, or how they are conveyed in an action, and by definition, by an action on matter.  
 
The anthropology of techniques (‘technologie culturelle’ in the French tradition, and 
‘material culture studies’ in the British tradition) is therefore merely one point of view 
among others on objects and techniques. It is the one that not only asks if an object is an 
element of a set of ‘political’, ‘religious’, ‘economic’, ‘artistic’ or other practices and 
representations; but also asks in what way its conception and its material production are 
characteristic of the human group that manufactures or uses it. As I show, paying 
attention to the most physical dimension of technical actions is a way to reveal 
fundamental information about a culture and its social organisation or system of thought 
that is provided by no other anthropological approach. 
 
1. Techniques as actions on the material world: some key ideas 
For anyone interested in action on matter, the purpose of an object cannot be 
understood without the gestures and knowledge needed to put it to use. The term 
operational sequence (the series of operations to be performed) designates the overall 
process that leads from a given state of matter to its transformed state. Usually, there is 
nothing to indicate where an operational sequence begins or ends. Why separate the 
felling of the trees, from the manufacture of the adze making it possible; or the making of 
the drum fashioned from the section of the tree trunk being cut up? These arbitrary 




The expression technical system is used by Mauss (2007 [1947]) in his Manuel 
d’ethnographie, in which, for the purposes of his analysis, the technical system is 
presented as an isolated aspect of social reality. The notion of a technical system was 
further developed by the historian Gille, who made it the fundamental concept of his 
Histoire des techniques (Gille 1978). As far as ethnographic description is concerned, 
techniques have a systematic character which can be characterised with three levels of 
interaction (Lemonnier 1992: 4-11). 
 
On the first level are the components, or elements, that interact with each other in any 
given technique (understood as a specific action on matter, delineated by the 
anthropologist, for whatever reason), for example, tying your shoelaces, landing a Boeing 
777, or carving chips from a block of wood. These components, or elements, which 
interact with one another are: the matter being acted on (which can be the body itself 
when one walks, swims, dances, etc.); tools; gestures; one or several sources of energy; 
actors; and ‘representations’. The components involved in any action aimed at obtaining 
some material result physically fit together, or are at least more or less mutually 
compatible in a physical sense. They form a system, in the simplest sense of the term, 
defined by the fact that a change in one element can lead to the modification of one or 
more of the others. If heating milk in a saucepan, control of the transformation from cold 
to boiling is different when comparing an electric plate to a gas hob. The heat remains 
when the electric power is cut, whereas it stops almost instantly with a gas cooker.  
The term ‘representation’ deserves special attention as it is deliberately vague and 
includes the extremely complicated processes labelled ‘skills’ – understood as ‘care, 
judgment and dexterity’ according to Ingold (1997: 111) – as well as sets of culturally 
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shared ideas about the components comprising a given technique. These skills are part of 
what anthropologists call ‘implicit’ or ‘tacit knowledge’. This type of knowledge is more 
of the type ‘to know how’ rather than of the type ‘to know that’ (Varela et al. 1993: 208) 
and it is not restricted to information about how to make the gestures and operations 
involved in a technical action. It is also made of particular mental skills, for instance, 
abilities to evaluate a situation in a fraction of a second and to adapt the ongoing 
technical process to it (Descola 2006: 11).  
This ‘know how’ is not comprised of a series of instructions or images listed 
somewhere in the brain that would constitute a sort of program to be executed. As a 
result, ‘it is not through the transmission of (programmatic forms of rules and 
representations) that skills are learned, but rather through a mixture of improvisation and 
imitation in the setting of practice’ (Ingold 1997: 111). This ‘know how’ and skills are 
embodied and drive actions that are made automatically: for instance you normally have 
no consciousness of the many and complex tasks you do while driving (Bloch 1998: 3-
21). 
‘Actors’ and ‘energy’ are also quite ambiguous terms because, from an emic point of 
view, some participants and powers in a technical action may belong to what we call the 
supernatural domain, in which the relationship between means and ends violates Western 
scientific knowledge (to whistle in order to chase the rain away is an example of such a 
violation). 
At a second level, in any one given society and at a given period of time, various 
techniques are linked with each other in various ways and for various reasons. Here are 
some examples:  
- A technical action depends on the preceding actions: you have to go and cut canes 
and saplings before you can lash together roof beams for your house; if there are 
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no tires produced and transported to a shop, you cannot get a complete wheel 
installed on you car; you have to remove the egg’s shell before you put it in a 
frying-pan. 
- Different techniques may use the same tool or machine (think about all the 
situations in which you have to screw or tighten something or pull something out 
with pliers or pincers); millions of different products can be made by lathes or 
drilling devices. 
- Different techniques can include identical steps (pieces of an operational 
sequence): whether you build a New Guinea house or a garden fence, you have to 
fell trees and make planks or posts out of the trunks. Welding sheet metal together 
is an operation common to many industries. 
- Different techniques can rely on the same actors, raw materials, etc.: for instance, 
the person who welds iron sheets in a car factory during the week is the same one 
who uses a lawn-mower at the week-end or a coffee-machine every morning. The 
raw material that is ordinary salt has innumerable culinary or chemical uses. 
- Techniques can result from the embodiment of identical representations in 
gestures and objects: e.g., knowledge about transformations for clay or iron 
underlies thousands of technical processes. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that Leroi-Gourhan’s programme on the ‘elementary 
means of action on the matter’ (1971, 1973) has not yet been seriously documented. Such 
an elementary means is, for instance ‘mixing’, whether you are preparing mayonnaise, 
cement, or orange cordial in a glass of water, you are doing a similar elementary action. 
How such a universal physical action is actually used by people has never been 
investigated; nor, as yet, have anthropologists tried to get information on the mental 
 6 
apparatus lying beyond such ‘representation’ (say, ‘adding some kind of liquid to a 
denser liquid, powder, or solid, gives a paste and homogenises it, etc.’). 
 
At a third level, the ways in which a technique or an object is manufactured, used or 
exchanged, is linked to practices and thought systems that go well beyond simple 
material effectiveness. A technical system is therefore always part of the socio-cultural 
whole that includes it. Social representations of techniques include more than the strict 
domain of action on matter.  
 
As a result, the relationship networks which material actions have with other social 
acts, or techniques, come from choices that are, to a greater extent, at all times, 
everywhere – even in the case of our most ‘modern and rational’ techniques – determined 
by considerations that are in no way technical (Bijker & Law 1992, Latour 1996). For 
want of a better expression, ‘technological choices’ — or technological ‘options’ — 
emphasise the sorting of possibilities on which the development of a technical system is 
de facto based, although usually in an unconscious and unintentional way, and they refer 
both to the process of selection and to its results. The whole problem is to identify where 
these choices come in; what is the logic behind them; what are their consequences and so 
on (Lemonnier 1993a). ‘Technical decisions’ regarding the building of a metro (Latour 
1996), the design of a missile guidance system (McKenzie 1990) or the fencing of 
gardens rather than pigs in New Guinea (Lemonnier 1993b) do not merely relate to 
technical actions, but to various ideas, that we label as ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘gender’, 
‘representations of beauty’, etc.  
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The ‘choices’ a society adopts, rejects or modifies in a technical component, entail 
elements that do not serve any material purpose — such as particular ideas about gender 
relations between the men and women who use the finished object; representations of the 
relationship between a given material and the cosmos or the gods; political considerations 
about organizing labour, etc. Such non-technical representations weigh just as heavily as 
mechanical components in the way an object is thought about and manufactured (or in the 
way a technique is put to use), its material effectiveness, and even the fate of those who 
use it (e.g., Schmidt 1996).  
 
Among the Anga people of Papua New Guinea, the use of a given type of tree bark for 
making capes or loincloths does not result from its affordability in a given ecological 
zone or specific technical knowledge. Rather, it is correlated to the use women have for 
this particular raw material: in those groups where women make and wear this type of 
beaten bark loincloth, it is literally unthinkable that men could use it. Consequently, men 
ignore the trees in question as a source of raw material for their own capes, using other 
trees instead (Lemonnier 1984, 1993a: 105-112). What is at stake is gender, and not some 
botanical adequacy of a raw material. 
 
2. Anthropological approaches to technology 
For years, most studies on how technology interfaces with other social behaviours 
have dealt either with the effects of technological systems on culture and society or with a 
search for the information human groups communicate when making and using artefacts. 
What social consequences followed the development of the steam engine, or the 
introduction of steel tools in ‘Neolithic’ New Guinean societies, or the stirrup in 
Medieval cavalry? These are all questions illustrating this approach. At a general level, 
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Marxist theory proposes the combination of ‘productive forces’ with ‘social relations of 
production’ and has resulted in the best known sociological and economic studies on the 
two-way interaction between the effects of techniques (and phenomena related to them) 
and other aspects of cultural and social organization. 
 
The second academic tradition comprises of various studies of ‘style’ by 
archaeologists and anthropologists. Style has mainly been read from artefacts through 
details of form and decoration as status markers (notably within social hierarchies or 
gendered positions) with a focus on the identities of groups and individuals, the makers 
or users of the artefacts. 
Although there is still a tendency, primarily in archaeology, to correlate stylistic 
details of artefacts or technical behaviour to the production of ‘meaning’ — e.g., the 
identity of the maker or user of artefacts of a certain form or decoration — many 
anthropological case studies have demonstrated that technological options have as much 
bearing on physical dimensions of material culture as on ‘style’. As mentioned above, à 
propos the Metro, missiles or everyday work in a New Guinea village, the human ability 
to produce and freely modify technological systems goes beyond formal features that 
have only unimportant effects on the material world. Technological choices may deeply 
affect the physical ‘function’ of an artefact — the quotation marks remind us that style, of 
course, has its own function. 
 
In the last three decades the very embedding of techniques in other types of social 
actions and thoughts have been investigated under two academic labels: ‘cultural 
technology’ and ‘material culture studies’. ‘Cultural technology’ has tried to carry on 
Mauss’s ‘utopic’ (Shlanger 1991, 2006: 147) programme of research by paying particular 
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attention to the way things are made and physically used; that is, by documenting and 
analysing ‘operational sequences’ (‘chaînes opératoires’), their components, and their 
variations in space and time; in order to explain how particular aspects of a technical 
system are linked to some local characteristics of social organisation, ritual life, or 
systems of thought. Examples of this approach can be found in case studies by Gosselain 
(1999, 2010), Mahias (1993, 2002), Lemonnier (1989, 1993a, 1993b), or Martinelli 
(1996, 2005), as well as in dozens of papers published in the journal Techniques et 
culture. 
 
Whereas the theory of ‘cultural technology’ has been developed by scholars directly 
influenced by Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan (1943, 1945, [1964] 1993) (among whom are 
Balfet 1975, 1996 and Cresswell 1972), material culture studies result from the blending 
of the anthropology of consumption, initiated by Douglas (Douglas and Isherwood 1979), 
with an interest in the ‘cultural biography of things’ (Kopytoff 1986). This approach is 
somewhat parallel to that of Latour (2005) on the social ‘agency’ of objects, and is 
notably illustrated in the Journal of Material Culture. Although dealing with the ‘social 
life of things’ (Appadurai 1986), material culture studies have mostly looked at the way 
objects are involved in various social strategies, identity and status issues, both in non-
industrial societies in the context of modernity, and in the industrial world, often with 
regard to the consumption of goods (Miller 1995, 2006, Keane 2006a). 
 
In recent years a series of scholars have successfully bridged the gap between material 
culture studies and cultural technology (e.g., Coupaye 2009, Damon 2008, Douny 2007, 
Revolon 2007). Simultaneously, attention is now paid in part to the ‘embodiment’ of 
particular aspects of local culture, via technical behaviour (body techniques have long 
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been the least developed section in the anthropology of objects and techniques). Such 
studies show that the engagement of the self and that of the body in technical action is 
produced by the partial embodiment or internalization of the subjects’ interactions with 
their cultural environment (Ingold 2000, 2004, Warnier 2001, 2007). We are still far from 
the comparative studies of body techniques which Lévi-Strauss ([1950: XIII-XIV] 1987) 
asked for almost sixty years ago! But at least the physical engagement of the actor with 
the material world has now become part of the picture. 
 
Further good news for the anthropology of technology is that real interdisciplinary 
cooperation is now becoming more common. Besides the old ongoing exchanges between 
archaeology and anthropology, they are now joined by disciplines such as art history, 
history of material culture, anthropology of art, cognitive anthropology, primatology, and 
philosophy which share questions with the anthropology of technology. In particular, 
many scholars agree to concentrate on the ‘agency’ or ‘materiality’ of objects with a 
growing interest in the role of objects and technical action in non-verbal communication. 
 
Following Gell’s (1998) book Art and Agency the ‘agency’ of objects has become a 
fashionable idea in anthropology today. Furthermore, Gell’s proposition to blur the 
border between art objects and utilitarian objects (Gell 1996), as well as the 
unconventional usage of the word ‘technology’ in his paper on ‘technology of 
enchantment’ (Gell 1992), are incentives to ask crucial questions about the very nature of 
objects. However, as Munn (1970) remarked long ago, the idea that objects have an 
agency of their own is far from new — it was clearly mentioned in that seminal 
anthropological text, ‘The Gift’, by Mauss (1954 [1925]). This ‘was concerned with 
social relationships in which people are bound together through the agency of things and 
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in which, therefore, the things are imbued with notions of persons’ (Munn 1970: 141). In 
other words, to say that objects have some sort of agency is just another way to remind 
ourselves that material culture can be the object of anthropological investigation. Once 
this ‘agency’ is acknowledged, we are beholden to document it, by understanding the 
relationships tying human beings to material objects. I would add that not only artefacts, 
but also actions on the material world in general should be studied. 
 
By referencing Gell’s work new and good things result in the anthropology of 
technology, as it makes dozens of scholars ask the same series of questions about 
artefacts. For instance: in what respect does an ‘ordinary’ object differ from a seemingly 
similar artefact, locally considered as a piece of art (or as a ritual object, a relic, etc.)? Is 
there a difference in the way these various things are produced and physically used? 
What do people do with objects, including ‘merely’ (if one dare say) building or 
reinforcing social relations through the use of artefacts. What kind of efficacy do they 
attribute to the object: a real or imaginary physical action on the material world or an 
inbuilt power of its own? In what respect does an object lead people to act on one 
another? Particularly, to evoke Mauss’ (1954 [1925]), Munn’s (1970) and Strathern’s 
(1988) intuitions, how and when is an artefact considered to be a person or an extension 
of a person? Needless to say, this fundamental question is deeply embedded in our own 
conceptions of ‘person’ and ‘object’ (Keane 2006a). 
 
‘Materiality’ is another fashionable catch-all term today (Miller 2005). On the one 
hand, it rightly leads us to ask what it means to invoke the association of social relations 
and shared ideas with a material object (and I would add, body technique)? It also leads 
us to the hackneyed theme in anthropology, what does ‘objectivation’ mean. This adds 
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another important question: how is the materiality of things involved in the thoughts and 
actions of people when they make or manipulate objects? For instance, what do people 
perceive of their physical characteristics or, as Keane (2006b) would put it, of their 
‘bundle’ of qualities. On the other hand, as Ingold (2007) remarks, understanding the 
materiality of things implies first and foremost a description of what happens to materials 
when they are transformed and experienced by those who manipulate them. That is, to 
‘return to the messy terrain of ethnography’ (Miller 2005: 41), and take seriously the 
‘imperative to get back to material things, and not to surrender physicality and sensuous 
experience to an exorbitation of language and the sign’ (Thomas 1998: 108). 
 
3. Two case studies about objects in non-verbal communication 
It is one thing to develop theoretical arguments pointing to the importance of the 
‘agency’ of objects, the local ins and outs of ‘materiality’ or the crucial interaction of 
bodies with the material world. It is another thing to document these theoretical intuitions 
in real life, in a real human group. Now is the time for patient and detailed case studies 
taking into account and investigating the manner by which systems of meaning and 
actions on matter are organised and enmeshed in human thoughts and actions (e.g., 
Lemonnier 1993b, 2005, Sillar 1996).  
The following ethnographic examples are illustrations of anthropological research 
paying close attention to making and using artefacts. I have chosen them because they 
both point to contemporary problems in the study of technology and fit my own interest 
in this field, but they should be understood as illustrating only one possible way to study 
technology. In particular, they present an hypothesis about a possible un-noted role for 
objects simultaneously bringing together entire series of thoughts and dealing with 
several (and various) aspects of the culture and social organisation belonging to those 
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who make and use them. In other words, the making and physical usage of some artefacts 
may be the only way people become aware of key aspects of a system of values and 
actions. Both case studies are from the Anga people of Papua New Guinea where I started 
my anthropological fieldwork in 1978, notably in the study of technology. 
 
3.1.  A sturdy fence to claim social order 
The first object we will discuss is an ordinary garden fence observed among the 
Baruya of Papua New Guinea. Generally in New Guinea the enclosures surrounding 
tuber gardens (and those containing sugar cane, bananas, etc.) result from a series of 
technical choices – rather than enclosing the animals and feeding them intensively, 
people prefer to protect their crops by enclosing the tuber gardens, while letting the 
animals forage freely. The women raising the animals then give them a kilo or so of 
tubers a day (Lemonnier 1993b). 
 
On the whole, this method has been retained by the Anga groups, but on closer 
observation, several important differences can be seen from group to group. In particular, 
the observer who visits the valleys on foot is struck by the ‘details’ of technical function, 
which are difficult to interpret or even seem quite aberrant. In Ankave villages, for 
instance, it is rare and even extremely rare to see a completed garden fence, which raises 
doubts as to their function as garden protection. The Baruya, on the other hand, erect 
barriers of sharp pointed stakes regularly measuring over 1.5 m (up to 2 m) in height, 
something which can seem surprising if one knows that even hungry pigs in New Guinea 
are hardly noted for their jumping skills, nor do they try to break through far flimsier 




< Figure 1 around here - BaruyaFence_1978_1.jpg>  
CAPTION: Figure 1. Far from being only a physical means to protect alimentary 
plants from the pigs, and to delimit family plots, a Baruya fence materializes and 
demonstrates crucial social relations: those between men and women, between male co-
initiates, and between brothers-in-law. 
 
 
These extremely sturdy Baruya fences are as impressive as they are non-‘functional’. 
Comprised of three layers of interlaced planks tightly lashed together they can, when 
maintained, firmly withstand the onslaught of any pig. My notes indicate that each 
running meter of fence contains over 50 boards, all painstakingly interwoven and tied 
together with lianas. This sturdy ‘aspect’ and the solidity of the oversized garden fences 
are the result of ten or fifteen men working together clearing a new garden in the forest. 
The women transport the fence stakes from old gardens in the valley, then gather and 
burn the underbrush, while the men — especially the garden-‘owner’s’ brothers-in-law 
and co-initiates — fell trees and build the fences over the course of a week or two. As the 
tree trunks are turned into boards or sharpened stakes and the fence is assembled, a 
veritable open-air workshop is on display to the observer.  
 
It is hard, too, not to notice that the fence is one of the occasions when male solidarity 
is displayed for all to see. In itself, this collective fencing effort is a reaffirmation of 
certain social relations, between close blood relatives, between brothers-in-law (above 
all), between co-initiates or between friends. The Baruya’s insatiable solidarity stands in 
opposition to the Ankave’s determination that everyone should mind their own business 
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(even if a neighbour is only a few minutes away) and to their strong penchant for long 
stays in the forest (Bonnemère 1996, Godelier 1986, Lemonnier 2006). When an 
individual garden is cleared, an Ankave man and his wife take on this forest work alone. 
Cooperation is almost exclusively the affair of the couple, and even then the husband and 
the wife carry out complementary tasks. Of course there are some contexts in which 
cooperation is just as intense among the Ankave as it is among the Baruya, particularly in 
warfare and male initiations. But for horticulture, hunting or the manufacture of objects, 
the Ankave and Baruya worlds are at opposite ends of the spectrum.  
 
Since no characteristic features of gestures, tools or technical knowledge account for 
this disparity in the way they organize their work, it must be attributable to other domains 
of social reality where radically different practices are observed between different Anga 
groups: namely, initiations, marriage, and ways of working together. This is what a study 
of cultural technology is able to demonstrate. 
 
Looking at a Baruya fence from a technological point of view — describing the 
artefact as well as its manufacture, comparing these observations with those from other 
Anga or New Guinea gardens fences, and placing the particular artefact and its associated 
technical activities into a comparative study of Anga social organizations at large — 
reveals that the collective effort of fencing a Baruya garden is a reaffirmation of a certain 
number of social relations as described earlier. In other words, these impressive ramparts 
against pigs are not only assigned the concrete task of establishing an impenetrable 
barrier between pigs and tubers. In them and through them, a whole portion of the Baruya 
social order is produced, with the emphasis first and foremost on cooperation but also an 
emphatic display of male solidarity, as a group opposed to the women. Further , there is 
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absolute reciprocal confidence and mutual assistance of the co-initiates, and, lastly, a 
focus on concordance and collaboration in work between brothers-in-law, who, according 
to the marriage rule, have ‘exchanged’ ‘sisters’.  
 
What is striking is that these social relations and moral rules rendered visible and 
literally embodied by the participants, are precisely those features setting the Northern 
Anga, Baruya, and also Sambia (Godelier 1986, Herdt 1981) radically apart from their 
neighbours in the south or the southwest, who in turn are characterized by a spectacularly 
low level of cooperation. Thus, a garden fence is a way to evoke a series of institutions, 
actions and social representations in a non-verbal way.  
 
In this first example, the aspects of a culture are demonstrated in a technical activity. 
The actual construction of the fence and its mechanical as well as visual sturdiness are 
often explicitly emphasised in various circumstances: in discourses during male 
initiations or inside the men’s house; each time brothers-in-law comment on their good or 
bad relationship; each time women are scolded by men. By contrast, in the following case 
study it is hypothesised that the manufacture and use of the artefact in question is a way 
to evoke aspects of culture that may not be verbalised. The artefact, a mortuary hand-
drum, is used by another Anga group, the Ankave, who live five to seven days walk away 
from the Baruya.  
 
3.2. A drum that does far more than produce sounds 
About once a year, the Ankave, a small group of forest horticulturalists, drive away 
(completely, they believe), the marauding ghosts of those who have recently died 
(pisingen siwi), during a ceremony called songen, named after the drums which are 
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beaten for several nights in a row. These drums look like hour-glasses, made of two long, 
tapered cones joined at the tips and sometimes surmounted by a handle (Bonnemère & 
Lemonnier 2007: 192-204), see Figure 2. 
 
 
<Figure 2 around here - Ankave_Drum_1987_1.jpg>  
CAPTION: Figure 2 Among the Ankave, making and beating the drums that funnel the 
spirits of the recent dead into another world amalgamates myth, technique, and ritual, and 
results in the non-verbal communication of a series of key values and aspects of their 
social organization and system of thought.  
 
 
These songen ceremonies are the most visible part of a thought system revolving 
around vile, man-eating beings, invisible and deeply hostile to humans, known as ombo’, 
which the Ankave hold responsible for most fatal illnesses. The ombo’ make up a band of 
invisible cannibals hosted inside seemingly ordinary human beings. The ombo’ attack, 
devour and share between them men, women and children who are believed to have 
refused to share things themselves. The obligation to acquiesce to all requests for food or 
objects is a pillar of Ankave social order for which the ombo’ are a constant reminder.  
According to the Ankave mythology, it is the ombo’ that humans also have to thank 
for the songen ceremonies, as well as for the masks worn by the drummers and the songs 
sung during the drumming. It is they who, from the depths of a swamp, brought humans 
the hour-glass drums, beaten night after night when it is time to definitively dispatch a 
pisingen siwi spirit, and to forget the deceased to whom the ghost belonged. The origin 
myth of the drums also contains an extraordinary spoken operational sequence, providing 
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a step-by-step explanation of how to make the instrument while underscoring the key 
aspects of the imaginary device whereby the Ankave dispose of their dead: the origin of 
the drum skin, made from the skin of a snake-man; and the importance of the ‘throat’ or 
middle part of the object (Lemonnier 2005). 
 
The myths also explain that the ombo’ make their own final circuits to the sound of the 
drumbeat, after men have kept them chained up night after night in our world. The hour-
glass drum plays a crucial role in dismissing the spirits of those who have died recently. 
Drawn in by the arms of the nowimboxo mask, the pisingen siwi spirit is driven towards 
the other world by the racket produced by the drum skin, the selfsame din that resounded 
on either side of the water when the Ankave ancestor discovered this wonderful object. 
At this point, the spirit of the deceased travels through the two pieces of the instrument. 
The myths recounting the origin of the songen ceremonies have much to say about this: 
the narrow piece that connects the two chambers of the drum and the python-skin 
membrane which acts as a gateway to eternity. In other words, an Ankave mortuary hour-
glass drum is not only a musical instrument, it is primarily a funnel-shaped psychopomp, 
that is to say the narrow canal whereby the ghost travels from the world of the living to 
that of the ombo’.  
 
Shamans say that these cannibal monsters feed on corpses, killing their victims by 
inserting objects into their veins or by cutting them, as well as by slashing their liver. 
Those Ankave people who have had the horrible surprise of identifying an ombo’ have 
recognized maternal kinsmen who looked exactly like their uncles or cousins, except for 
their red eyes and dog-like ears. For the Ankave, a foetus is believed to feed on maternal 
blood, and everyone agrees that a brother has given to his sister’s children the life-giving 
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blood he shares with her. This is one reason why maternal kin always claim they have not 
received enough gifts to compensate the birth of children who are ‘one blood ‘ with them. 
In the Ankave worldview there is no way to compensate for the blood-life one receives 
from his maternal kin. And this is the reason why the ombo’ are like mothers who eat 
their own children.  
 
But this is not yet the end of the story, as revealed by a contextualizing anthropology 
of technology. An Ankave mortuary drum is more than a double funnel linking the two 
sides of the same entity — the Ankave society — with its living and its dead. On the one 
hand, this artefact does what art or ‘images’ do according to various anthropologists. For 
Wagner, ‘[a]n image has the power of synthesis: it condenses whole realms of possible 
ideas and interpretations and allows complex relationships to be perceived and grasped in 
an instant … the power of eliciting [causing to perceive] all sorts of meanings in those 
who use and hear it’ (Wagner 1987: 56).On the other hand, an Ankave drum is neither a 
piece of art nor merely an image. 
  
To understand an object according to the theory and methods of the anthropology of 
techniques one has to consider it within the full complexity of the operational sequences 
in which it appears, as well as in the systems of thought that refer to it. In the present 
case, if one considers the drum together with the night ceremony, and with the making of 
the drums, and with the operational sequence given in myths, one realises that it is not the 
object alone that has what Gell called ‘objectification of complex intentionalities’ (Gell 
1996: 37).  
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In my view, while using the drums the Ankave are mixing together thoughts and 
actions belonging to various domains of Ankave culture, social organization and 
imagination. Collectively beating the drums is a unique way of putting together myth, 
ritual action and material actions, by doing things, and not by simply looking at them (as 
for an image) or talking about them (as when evaluating art objects). It is because of the 
drums on which they are focused, and through the material actions by which they are 
fabricated and used, through contact with the matter — making the drums, beating the 
drums, singing, waving the ‘hands’ of the masks, walking in line for hours — that various 
aspects of Ankave social life are made present to the minds of the participants. These 
various domains of social action are: the ambiguity of maternal uncles (both cherishing 
and devouring); the reason shamans have to treat the ombo’s victims and the physical 
damages to the latter’s innards; the necessity of performing songen ceremonies to manage 
mourning; the local representation of life and the overwhelming importance of maternal 
blood; the origin of the drums, etc.  
 
With regard to the general ‘message’, ‘meaning’, or ‘social value’ that is common to 
these various instances of social life, these domains are redundant, for they all refer to the 
idea that you will never be able to repay ‘the life your maternal kin gives you, thus, the 
maternal kin will take it back in the guise of the cannibal ombo’s involvement in 
mortuary procedures’, say the Ankave. It is this same message that is spoken, illustrated, 
and put into objects and actions in various ways. The drums themselves, making the 
drums, and thinking about the drums, as well as beating the drums in general, all signal in 
a non-verbal way the reasons why and when these domains have to be evoked together – 
when the ombo’ recapture the life they have given. It is a reminder that some things, 
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thoughts, hierarchies, histories and gestures have to be thought together. And, most 
importantly, it evokes the very reasons why they have to be linked.  
 
The difference with the case of the Baruya fence is that the meaning brought to the 
minds of the participant of a songen ceremony cannot be put in words. This particular 
technical device, a drum used in a ritual context, illustrates these ‘implicit non-verbal 
statements’, ‘unspeakable truths’, as well as the ‘blurring of boundaries’ (between the 
living and the dead) that Tuzin (2002) linked with the ‘crafting of an illusion’ in art 
objects.  
 
It is worth pointing out that I have not merely hypothesised a vague ‘agency’ of drums 
in Ankave culture. Rather, I have explained what that agency is about, and how it works. 
Also, rather than adding more vehement paragraphs on the necessity of burying all 
dualisms—nature/culture, spiritual/material, style/function —I have documented two 
ethnographic cases paying attention to the actual physical making and using of things in 
the embedding of meaning and physical actions.  
 
Regarding the two Anga examples above, the new questions that arise are: what are 
the differences between an art object, a ritual object such as an Ankave drum, and a non-
ritual and non-art object like a Baruya fence? At any rate, the answers to these questions 
would be established only by careful observation, description and analyses of artefacts 
and technical behaviour comprising their whole social context, in the widest sense and 
linguistics has a key role to play here.  
 
4. Linguistics and technology: field questions and methods 
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Besides reflections on the links between the evolution of human ability to develop 
technical actions on the material world and the origin of language (Leroi-Gourhan [1964] 
1993, Ingold 1999), the theoretical relationships between technique and speech that have 
been studied take several forms, all related to the various ways techniques and objects are 
associated with ‘meaning’ or, more generally, some kind of information. But these 
relationships between linguistics and the anthropological study of technology are 
paradoxically poorly developed. On the one hand, it is obvious that no technical action 
can be understood as part of a global social system without paying utmost attention to 
hours of spontaneous speech or comments on that action; on the other hand, field studies 
linking the two fields of research are in fact extremely rare.  
With the exception of vague and superficial propositions, considering technical actions 
on matter as some sort of speech, that is, using language as an analogy to understand 
some aspects of techniques, has given poor results. For instance, Baudrillard’s mention of 
weird elementary ‘technèmes’, the combination of which was supposed to characterize 
artefacts and machines (Baudrillard 1968: 12-13) led nowhere. A technical action (chaine 
opératoire) is not a ‘sentence’ in which a combination of operations, matter, and actors 
following some kind of ‘grammar’ would result in a modification in the material world 
that, in turn, could be glossed as the ‘meaning’ of that technical action. More efficiently, 
most studies have concentrated on the information that techniques and artefacts contain 
and convey. This information — or ‘meaning’ — has to be understood both from a wide 
etic point of view (what do techniques, in their most physical form do in social 
relationships?) as well as from an emic point of view (for the people who make and use 
them, artefacts are markers of some identity; artefacts are inscribed with some 
information; etc.).  
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A good reason for this failure to apply some kind of semiotic theory to technical 
processes derives from the complex aspects of that information and processing that 
comprise what anthropologists call ‘tacit (or implicit) knowledge’. As Bloch (1998: 11) 
stated long ago after showing that the operations needed to drive a car ‘not only are not 
linguistic but also must be non-linguistic if they are to be efficient’. The automation of 
gestures and mental operations (e.g., what you do in order to overtake another car) that 
result from a long process of apprenticeship, implies that the actors are not (or no more) 
conscious of them, and this indirectly makes it hard for the anthropologist trying to grasp 
them (Mahias 2002: 97-108). Any comment by the actor is welcome for it may help 
understand what kind of phenomena are involved, together with the words used to 
describe the elements put together in a technical process. A good example is Delaporte’s 
(2002) work on the ‘herder’s eye’ in which he explains how Sami herders are able to 
grasp, in one glance, a set of information which allows them to recognize one particular 
animal in a herd of several hundreds of animals.  
 
From the point of view of the social scientist, distinguishing one artefact from another 
by its form, decoration or characteristics of fabrication, that is, by studying its ‘style’, one 
is able to make hypotheses on the homogeneity, particularities and inscription in a 
historical or regional setting of the group of people who produced or used them. As 
mentioned earlier, this approach is the first step of most archaeological research. In 
anthropology, the deciphering of style has been mostly limited to the marking of identity, 
following two researchers whose work was influenced by linguistic theory: Bogatyrev 
(1971), for whom the folk costume of Moravian Slovakia was a ‘sign’, and Wobst who 
studied the components of the Yugoslav costume as pieces in a process of information 
exchange (Wobst 1977: 321). Delaporte’s work (1988), which is also on costume (that of 
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the Sami) is among the very few studies that envisage the functioning of such a system of 
signs, that is to identify which are the units used to produce meaning, or what is the 
nature of the ‘meaning’ thus produced.  
 
The recent and promising trend in research on technology explores the multiple and 
diverse manners in which the very materiality of objects and technical actions are part of 
a system of thought, social relations and actions. However, a linguistic approach to 
artefacts in the making is extremely rare. Not surprisingly it was developed by French 
scholars who were more or less influenced by Haudricourt (1988), who was both a 
linguist and ‘technologue’, and by Leroi-Gourhan and his students. In case studies on 
weaving (Lefébure 1978, Drettas 1980) or the domestic kneading of dough (Virolle-
Souibès 1989), a painstaking recording and description of the vocabulary associated with 
a given technique, as well as a study of the connotations of the terms (their semantic 
field) allows us to grasp some links between technical acts, what people say about them, 
and the various activities, symbolic or not, relating to the activity as a whole and to its 
components. 
 
As we have seen in the Anga cases studies above, some techniques, such as the 
making of a Baruya garden fence, may be a way to repeat and make tangible some 
essential aspects of a social system, institutions, shared representations, etc. Others, such 
as the Ankave mortuary drum and ceremony evoke and gather aspects of a culture, social 
organisation, and system of thought that may not be verbalised. But, at any rate, these 
non-verbal ways to evoke key sets of relations (or values) of a given human group cannot 
be discovered without careful attention to whatever words are uttered about these 
relations as well as technical actions. If one does not listen to Baruya men boasting about 
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male cooperation, or to Baruya brothers-in-law having a row because they did not do 
some work that they should have, there is no way to realise that making a fence is more 
than making a fence. Similarly, without the words that tell the origin myth of the Ankave 
drum, or the words that describe the parts of the drum (notably its middle, or ‘throat’ that 
swallows the spirits of the recent dead), I have would have had no clue about the 
complexity of what is going on when people make or beat drums.  
 
5. Collecting linguistic data on techniques 
The collection and analysis of the vocabulary is of crucial importance here: its 
signification and connotations may reveal links between the technical domain and other 
domains, as clues to the way the processes in question are represented. As Lefébure 
(1983) warned long ago, this does not mean that the linguistic structure of the speech 
about a technique may reveal a concealed technical structure of sorts. But the words in 
question may reveal how a technical action, its elements and social context are 
represented. 
 
The words to be recorded in the field are those used to qualify the elements of the 
operational sequences: the matter being transformed, the names of its different states and 
particularities of these states according to the actors; the tools and their components, the 
parts which are named and those which are not; the gestures; the energies; the actors, 
including the invisible powers at hand – if any. Operations might have their own names, 
as also might the different steps in a given operation. For example, by noting the phonetic 
proximity between the name for ‘blood clot’ and that for a given state of the liquid paste 
in question, Bonnemère’s (1998: 116) study of the preparation of red pandanus fruits’ 
juice is a clue to the fundamental equation made by the Ankave-Anga between that 
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culinary preparation and human blood. There may be also local names for ‘know-how’, 
‘skills’, ‘specialists’, etc. 
At first, one is overwhelmed by what has to be observed, understood, and recorded 
with the greatest detail possible in order to be able to understand and explain what is 
going on in a particular technique observed in a given place at a certain time. In other 
words, the anthropologist must find some way to be able to see and record which are the 
gestures, tools, and material put together during each step of an operational sequence. 
What is the energy used? Who are the actors (and the bystanders)? Are there any 
comments? What is the duration of each operation? Are these operations named? This is 
the only way to be able to discover and understand what are the local characteristics of a 
technique in a particular society. The more precise the description, the better. Fortunately, 
modern technologies are of great help to record most of these data. 
 
As explained elsewhere (Lemonnier 1992: 27-30), technical actions are often 
repetitive, which gives the observer some chance to grasp the characteristics of a given 
operational sequence. Video recording is an easy way to document technical actions, as 
long as the researcher remains extremely attentive to what is going on. Back home, it will 
be too late to ask questions about the action that has been filmed. A good description 
entails some ability to manipulate simultaneously a pencil, two cameras (photo and 
video), a stopwatch, and a tape recorder. Believe it or not, with some training, this is 
quite easy. Exhausting, but easy. (See also Margetts & Margetts in this volume)  
 
If possible, one should consider that one description of a given technical sequence is 
not enough, for the good reason that most of the questions that come to the observer’s 
mind result from differences s/he has noticed between seemingly similar operations. 
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Documenting all sorts of variants is essential here. From one day to another, the same 
agent may work differently. Two actors may have their own way of doing things, and so 
on. Observing the same series of technical actions (house building, basket making, 
cooking food, and tens of other mundane or less mundane technical actions), between 
two neighbouring groups, whatever ‘group’ means in a given situation, is quite 
rewarding.  
Participant observation deserves a special mention here, for it is not only a way to 
share people’s life and activities; it is also a way to grasp aspects of a technical process 
that would otherwise escape the anthropologist’s observation or the actor’s comments. 
One does not need to be a good potter to describe pottery, but some kind of 
apprenticeship can be a useful tool in understanding technical processes, allowing the 
formulation of specific questions. This also gives access to the implicit knowledge 
mentioned above. 
 
It is important for documenting technical activities and their links to other social 
spheres of activity to collect descriptions (plural!) of technical activities, including 
comments at the particular moment of that activity. More generally, it is interesting to 
know what part of a technical activity is verbalised, never mentioned, or is forbidden to 
be mentioned. Besides the identification of variants — which really constitute the bulk of 
the data analysed — the identification of strategic operations (Lemonnier 1992: 21-24) is 
of importance. These are particular actions or steps in an operational sequence that cannot 
be delayed or profoundly modified without jeopardising the whole process at hand. It is 
interesting to know both what operations are considered to be ‘strategic’ and how those 
operations that are crucial from a physical point of view are dealt with. This is of course 
where technical specialists and social hierarchies may enter the picture. 
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Needless to say, neither the objects nor the physical actions of the actors manipulating 
them say things plainly about the ‘meanings’ in question, particularly when artefacts lack 
any decoration. To have people describe in their own words what they are doing is of 
utmost importance because, on the one hand, they show their personal organization 
strategies for an operational sequence, and, on the other hand, they may both emphasise 
or keep uncommented particular aspects of the technique (or object) in question. 
Therefore, it is only by listening to what people say about these artefacts and technical 
activities, as well as what they say in any of the activities which are related to them in 
some way or another, that it is possible to grasp the complex insertion of technical 
behaviour within various other social logics, including their role in non-verbal 
communication. Together with a precise understanding of the physical (mechanical, etc.) 
aspects of an artefact, linguistics is a way to enquire into the ‘bundle’ of qualities (Keane 
2006b) within an object which are ready to be ‘chosen’ by members of a given culture, 
either to act on the matter in a given way and with a certain efficacy, or to include this 
artefact or material in a particular system of meaning and/or social relations. 
For instance, when the Ankave-Anga of Papua New Guinea use a given plant 
(cordylines) as fences, territory markers, and key element of sacred sites, they elaborate 
on one of the inherent qualities of that particular plant, which is its vegetative 
reproduction. It is plausible that the cordylines used today are the clones, i.e. totally 
similar, to the ones that grew on an ancestral spot, according to myth. The perception of a 
particular characteristic of the plant therefore reinforces the veracity of the myth as well 
as the social efficacy of the artefacts made with the plant. 
 
It is hardly necessary to remark that, in the present state of the anthropology of 
techniques and objects, no particular approach is more appropriate than another in 
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understanding what people exactly ‘do’ when they act on the material world. The main 
challenge, now, is to understand how the phenomena addressed by the various possible 
approaches are, indeed, linked together within a technical action. Paying attention to the 
way people ‘tell’ their techniques is an essential part of this programme. 
